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This Article is the first to take a hard look at Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(c)(4)(B), an oft-slighted part of the class action scheme 
that permits a court to create subclasses “when appropriate.”  Despite 
its tautologically unhelpful text, no other court or commentator has 
undertaken a comprehensive analysis of this provision.  The time to do 
so is certainly now.  As class actions grow bigger, plaintiffs seek new 
ways to meet Rule 23’s certification requirements.  Just in the last few 
years, plaintiffs have turned to subclassing’s sister provision, Rule 
23(c)(4)(A), which has consequently received a flurry of commentary 
from courts and academics.  The subclassing provision, which provides 
an alternative mechanism to Rule 23(c)(4)(A), is therefore ripe for a 
similar spate of commentary and conflict.  This Article sets the stage for 
that discussion by formulating two conflicting theories of subclassing: 
the replacement theory, which posits that subclasses can be certified 
without regard to the certifiability of the global class action, and the 
contingency theory, which requires any subclass to be a part of a 
certified global class.  Testing these interpretations of Rule 23(c)(4)(B) 
against the traditional tools of statutory interpretation—text, context, 
structure, drafting history, precedent, and functionality—this Article 
concludes that the replacement theory is the best interpretation of the 
subclassing provision.  Nevertheless, this Article notes the arguments to 
the contrary and suggests that they serve as a call to the Rules 





Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs class 
actions in federal court.  Overshadowed by the powerhouse certification 
provisions of Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3), is the oft-overlooked 
subclassing provision of Rule 23(c)(4)(B), which states: “When 
appropriate . . . a class may be divided into subclasses and each subclass 
treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be construed 
and applied accordingly.”1  That is all the textual guidance the Federal 
Rules provide on the subject of subclasses, and its meaning is far from 
 
 *  Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas School of Law (effective Fall, 2006). 
 1 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4)(B). 
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clear.  How does Rule 23(c)(4) relate to the certifiability of a class?  
When, indeed, is it appropriate to subclass?  The Rule’s tautological 
answer is no answer at all, and the interrelationships between Rule 
23(c)(4) and Rules 23(a) and (b) are unclear. 
The text has remained unchanged since 1966.  Despite its age, no 
one has given Rule 23(c)(4)(B) the treatment it deserves.  A few courts 
have staked out different positions on the proper role of subclasses in 
certification decisions, but their reasoning is sparse and superficial at 
best.2  The Supreme Court has yet to resolve the issue, though it has 
danced around it several times in the last few years.3  Congress, too, 
missed a golden opportunity to clarify the meaning of the subclassing 
provision when it passed the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, but, 
unfortunately, that act does not deal with subclassing at all.4  No other 
scholar has taken up this subject to give Rule 23(c)(4)(B) the attention it 
is due.5  Thus, the questions regarding the proper role of subclasses in 
certification decisions remain unanswered. 
The time to answer them has come.  Class actions are becoming 
increasingly larger.  As the classes become bigger, the stakes become 
higher, for the proverbial eggs are all in one basket.  The question of 
class certification in these massive class actions becomes the critical 
issue, often leading to either settlement or dismissal.  With the weight of 
the suit riding on certification, class plaintiffs are finding creative ways 
to argue in favor of certification.  One of those ways is the use of the 
 
 2 See infra text accompanying notes 110-129. 
 3 See infra text accompanying notes 59-109. 
 4 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4. 
 5 See Michael P. Malakoff & Erin M. Brady, Taming the Uncommon Issues: What Role 
Should Subclasses Play in Rule 23(b)(3) Certification?, 772 PRACTISING L. INST.: CONSUMER 
FINANCIAL SERVICES LITIGATION 329 (1998) (arguing that subclassing cannot be a substitute for 
global class certification, but failing to address the textual support for the contrary interpretation); 
Susan Bisom-Rapp, Comment, The Use of Subclasses in Class Action Suits Under Title VII, 9 
INDUS. REL. L.J. 116 (1987) (arguing that subclasses can replace a global, uncertifiable class 
based on the liberal policy of using the class mechanism to vindicate individual rights, but failing 
to address the contrary indications of the structure of Rule 23); Note, Certifying Classes and 
Subclasses in Title VII Suits, 99 HARV. L. REV. 619 (1986) (touching upon subclass certification, 
but not addressing whether subclasses may be certified if a global class cannot be).  The three 
most prominent treatises on civil procedure take a broad view of the use of subclasses to solve 
commonality or predominance problems that may prevent certification in a global class, though 
they do not offer justification for their position.  See 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1778, at 546 (2d ed. 1986) (suggesting that subclassing 
could make the common issues in the subdivided class action predominate for the purposes of 
Rule 23(b)(3)); 8 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 
24:24, at 145 (4th ed. 2002) (“Bifurcation or the creation of subclasses may circumvent 
commonality problems.”); 5 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.23[3], at 
23-76 (3d ed. 2005) (“Similarly, if common questions do not exist among members of the class as 
proposed, Rule 23(c)(4) permits a court to create subclasses . . . in order to satisfy the 
commonality requirement.”).  In short, no one has yet proffered the results of a comprehensive 
analysis of Rule 23(c)(4)(B). 
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“issue class” of Rule 23(c)(4)(A), which states that an action may be 
maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues.6  The 
propriety of certifying “issue classes” as a way of avoiding certification 
of the global class has arisen relatively recently, and already some 
commentary has developed.7  Although courts have addressed the 
issue,8 as of yet there is no consensus on the proper role of “issue 
classes.” 
A different method is the use of Rule 23(c)(4)(A)’s sister 
provision, the subclass mechanism of Rule 23(b)(4)(B), to bypass 
certification of a global class that cannot meet the certification 
requirements.  Whether this is a proper use of subclassing is an issue 
that has been bubbling just beneath the surface.  Unlike the issue class 
provision, however, far fewer scholars and courts have taken a hard 
look at the use of the subclassing provision for purposes of certifying an 
otherwise uncertifiable global class. 
This Article takes up that challenge.  Part I provides background 
on the purpose and text of Rule 23, critical to understanding the 
certification standards and how the subclass provision fits into the class 
action scheme.  Part II explains the trend towards large class actions, the 
problems they cause for certification, and the potential solution of 
subclasses. 
Part III begins the interpretative process by identifying two 
conflicting theories of the proper role of subclasses: the “contingency 
theory,” which states that certification of subclasses is contingent on 
certification of the global class, and the “replacement theory,” which 
states that certification of subclasses can replace the global class and 
obviate the need for its certification. 
 
 6 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4)(A) (“When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or 
maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues . . . .”). 
 7 The commentary is not in agreement.  Compare Laura J. Hines, The Dangerous Allure of 
the Issue Class Action, 79 IND. L.J. 567 (2004) [hereinafter Hines, Dangerous Allure] (arguing 
that before an issue class may be certified, the entire class must be certifiable), and Laura J. 
Hines, Challenging the Issue Class Action End-Run, 52 EMORY L.J. 709 (2003) [hereinafter 
Hines, End-Run] (same), and David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 955 (1998) (agreeing that Rule 23(b)(3) overrides issue certification 
unless those issues do “predominate” over the individual issues in the case), with MANUAL FOR 
COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 30.17 (1995) (supporting the opposite), and NEWBERG, supra 
note 5, §§ 4:23, 4.24 (same), and 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 5, § 1790 (same), and Elizabeth 
J. Cabraser, The Class Action Counterreformation, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1475, 1499-506 (2005) 
(urging greater use of Rule 23(c)(4)(A) to certify issue classes), with Robert G. Bone, Rule 23 
Redux: Empowering the Federal Class Action, 14 REV. LITIG. 79, 95-96 (1994) (same), and Jon 
Romberg, Half a Loaf is Predominant and Superior to None: Class Certification of Particular 
Issues Under Rule 23(c)(4)(A), 2002 UTAH L. REV. 249, 263 (“[C]ases that do not otherwise meet 
the predominance and superiority requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) can be certified as issue 
classes.”). 
 8 See infra text accompanying notes 146-167. 
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Part IV demonstrates that the traditional tools for interpretation 
suggest that the replacement theory is the proper interpretation of Rule 
23(c)(4)(B).  Although the drafting history of the provision is 
inconclusive, the commentary is inconsistent, and the few judicial 
pronouncements available provide only unreasoned conclusions, the 
text of Rule 23(c)(4)(B) supports the replacement theory, and the 
prevailing interpretation of its sister provision, Rule 23(c)(4)(A), 
provides additional support.  There are certainly counterarguments—the 
most prominent being the structural argument that the subclassing 
provision resides within the manageability section rather than the 
certification sections—but these arguments do not, in my opinion, 
outgun the textual support for the replacement theory. 
 
I.     BACKGROUND 
A.     The Purpose and Benefits of Class Actions 
 
The plaintiff class action suit is a single-action litigation of 
multiple claims in a representative capacity.  Essentially, one or a few 
named parties bring suit on behalf of all similarly situated plaintiffs.  
The unnamed plaintiffs need not participate in the suit, though they are 
bound—unless they opt out—by any merits decision for or against the 
class.9 
This mechanism serves at least four purposes.10  First, it promotes 
judicial economy by consolidating multiple but similar claims into one 
to litigate the common elements simultaneously.11  Second, it provides a 
forum for redress of small claims that are too expensive to pursue 
individually.12  Third, it cuts costs for both plaintiffs and defendants.  
For plaintiffs, the costs of pursuing the litigation are spread among all 
 
 9 See Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 874 (1992). 
 10 There are others.  Class actions protect plaintiffs against a race to the courtroom against 
defendants with limited funds.  They also prevent the defendant from picking a particularly weak 
individual action to litigate to get a favorable decision, which it can then use to collaterally estop 
subsequent individual actions. 
 11 Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 (1982). 
 12 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985) (“Class actions permit the 
plaintiffs to pool claims which would be uneconomical to litigate individually.”).  The Supreme 
Court has gone so far as to suggest that this is a core justification for class actions.  See Amchem 
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 
F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)):  
The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem 
that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo 
action prosecuting his or her rights.  A class action solves this problem by aggregating 
the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone’s (usually an 
attorney’s) labor. 
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plaintiffs and common issues are only litigated once.13  For defendants, 
large numbers of potential lawsuits are consolidated into one 
proceeding, thereby eliminating duplicative litigation.  Fourth, class 
actions prevent the inequity of separate adjudications resulting in 
inconsistent results by, for example, imposing conflicting standards on a 
single defendant.14 
The principal downside is that the class action suit is a 
representative suit, despite the general rule that litigation be conducted 
by named parties only,15 which sacrifices some individual autonomy 
over one’s own claims and risks inadequate or unfair representation.16  
Indeed, class members who are not class representatives have no right 
to interfere in the litigation.  Under certain circumstances, individual 
class members may be able to “opt out” of the class,17 but they cannot 
direct the case without becoming representatives.  As Judge Posner has 
stated, this kind of representative suit can lead to unfairness or even 
abuse: 
The class action is an awkward device, requiring careful judicial 
supervision, because the fate of the class members is to a 
considerable extent in the hands of a single plaintiff (or handful of 
plaintiffs . . .) whom the other members of the class may not know 
and who may not be able or willing to be an adequate fiduciary of 
their interests.  Often the class representative has a merely nominal 
stake . . . , and the real plaintiff in interest is then the lawyer for the 
class, who may have interests that diverge from those of the class 
members.  The lawyer for the class is not hired by the members of 
the class and his fee will be determined by the court rather than by 
contract with paying clients.  The cases have remarked the danger 
that the lawyer will sell out the class in exchange for the defendant’s 
tacit agreement not to challenge the lawyer’s fee request. . . .  Rule 
23 tries to minimize the potential abuses of the class action device in 
two principal ways, first by insisting that the class be reasonably 
homogeneous, . . . and second by insisting that the class 
representative be shown to be an adequate representative of the 
class.18 
 
 13 U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 402-03 (1980). 
 14 Id. 
 15 Falcon, 457 U.S. at 155. 
 16 Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940). 
 17 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (stating that “the court will exclude from the class any 
member who requests exclusion”). 
 18 Culver v. City of Milwaukee, 277 F.3d 908, 910 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.); accord 
Greenfield v. Villager Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 832 n.9 (3d Cir. 1973) (“Experience teaches that 
it is counsel for the class representative and not the named parties, who direct and manage these 
actions.  Every experienced federal judge knows that any statements to the contrary is [sic] sheer 
sophistry.”). 
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Another downside is that class actions create their own 
inefficiencies that can counteract the efficiencies of consolidation that 
the class mechanism normally encourages.  For example, the larger the 
class scope, the higher the stakes for class certification.  Thus, the 
certification decision in massive class actions is often the most 
contentious phase of the litigation.  For such expansive classes, 
certification is more difficult as well because wider differences among a 
broad group tend to minimize the commonality uniting the members, a 
prerequisite to certification.  As a result, more time and money may be 
spent on the procedural hurdle of certification than on the merits.  In 
addition, simple management of the due process concerns of the class, 
such as notification, present their own difficulties.  In a products 
liability class involving millions of purchasers, for example, 
identification of potential class members alone may be a near 
impossible feat, and the mailing costs of notices may be cost-
prohibitive.19  The end result of this downside is excessive delay of 
relief for individual class members20 and unnecessarily high transaction 
costs associated with managing the class and litigation.  These 
downsides cut against the salutary benefits of the class mechanism. 
 
B.     Structure of Rule 23 
 
The structure of Rule 23 reflects the drafters’ intent to maximize 
the salutary benefits of the class mechanism while minimizing its 
detractions.  The crux of Rule 23 is to ensure that “maintenance of a 
class action is economical and the named plaintiffs’ claim and the class 
claims are so interrelated that the interests of the class members will be 
fairly and adequately protected in their absence.”21 
Rule 23(a), entitled “Prerequisites to a Class Action,” states that 
“[o]ne or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative 
parties on behalf of [the others] only if” the four prerequisites of 
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy are met.22 
Numerosity is met when the class is “so numerous that joinder of 
all members is impractical.”23  This prerequisite demonstrates the 
drafters’ recognition that, when practical, the joinder of the plaintiffs is 
 
 19 See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 747 (5th Cir. 1996) (identifying the cost of 
providing “notice to millions of class members” as contributing to the “extensive manageability 
problems” of class certification). 
 20 See David Rosenberg, Of End Games and Openings in Mass Tort Cases: Lessons From a 
Special Master, 69 B.U. L. REV. 695, 710 (1989). 
 21 Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982). 
 22 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 23 Id. at R. 23(a)(1). 
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preferable to class actions because each joined claimant has separate 
counsel and independent control over his own claims.  The numerosity 
requirement sets a baseline criterion below which representative suits 
are not justified in light of the alternatives. 
Commonality is met when “there are questions of law or fact 
common to the class.”24  This prerequisite ensures that at least some 
minimal level of commonality unites the class so that a class-wide 
determination on the common issues can fairly resolve those issues for 
each class member.  Without at least one common issue, class resolution 
is simply too cumbersome to be productive. 
Typicality is met when “the claims or defenses of the 
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the 
class.”25  This prerequisite ensures that the claims of the named 
representatives are sufficiently similar to the claims of the other class 
members to justify possible representation of class claims by proxy. 
Similarly, adequacy is met when “the representative parties will 
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”26  This 
prerequisite is broader than typicality and focuses not only on whether 
the interests of the named representatives and the other class members 
are aligned, but also on the quality of the named representatives.  If a 
named representative is inadequate to represent the class, because, for 
example, he has some conflict of interest or incapacitation, he is not an 
adequate representative even if his claims are typical of the class claims. 
If these baseline “prerequisites” of Rule 23(a) are met, then the 
action may have sufficient benefits and minimal detractions to qualify 
for class action treatment.  That Rule 23(a) is satisfied, however, does 
not mean that the class should be certified as a class action.27  Rule 
23(a) only sets the baseline qualifications.  Rule 23 imposes additional 
conditions for the class to be “maintained” as a class action to ensure 
that the class action is the best method for resolving the disputes.28 
Under the first condition, Rule 23(b)(1), a class may be certified if 
the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of 
the class would create a risk of (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications 
establishing incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing 
the class or (B) adjudications which would be dispositive of the interests 
of other members not parties to the adjudications.29  Rule 23(b)(1) 
 
 24 Id. at R. 23(a)(2). 
 25 Id. at R. 23(a)(3). 
 26 Id. at R. 23(a)(4). 
 27 Id. at R. 23(a), advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendments (stating that Rule 23(a)’s 
prerequisites are “necessary but not sufficient conditions for a class action”). 
 28 Id. at R. 23(b). 
 29 Id. at R. 23(b)(1); see also id. at R. 23(b)(1), advisory committee’s notes to 1966 
amendment. 
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describes one of the “natural” class actions: when individual actions 
would create incompatible standards for the defendant to follow or 
would threaten the ability of the plaintiffs to protect their own 
interests.30  In these instances, a class action is a necessary joinder 
device to prevent the injustices that would result from separate 
litigation.31 
Under the second condition, a Rule 23(b)(2) class may be certified 
if “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds 
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final 
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the 
class as a whole.”32  This section is most useful—and most used—in the 
civil rights field, in which the defendant’s conduct affects classes of 
people in the same way.33  Although the class mechanism is not as 
necessary in this context as it is in the Rule 23(b)(1) context, it logically 
lends itself to Rule 23(b)(2) classes, particularly discrimination classes, 
for, as the Supreme Court has stated, discrimination is, by definition, 
class-based.34 
The last condition, Rule 23(b)(3), is a catchall, discretionary 
aggregation device for cases that do not inherently lend themselves to 
class treatment but nevertheless may be adjudicated on a class basis if 
efficiency is furthered and adequate representation is secured.35  Rule 
23(b)(3) allows for certification when “the court finds that the questions 
of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over 
any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action 
is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient 
adjudication of the controversy.”36  Matters “pertinent” to the Rule 
23(b)(3) “predominace” and “superiority” determination include (A) the 
members’ interest in individually controlling their own actions; (B) the 
extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already 
 
 30 See Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 388 (1967); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 
23(b)(1), advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment (“The difficulties which would be 
likely to arise if resort were had to separate actions . . . here furnish the reasons for, and the 
principal key to, the propriety and value of utilizing the class-action device.”). 
 31 See Hines, Dangerous Allure, supra note 7, at 590. 
 32 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
 33 See Kaplan, supra note 30, at 389; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2), advisory committee’s 
notes to 1966 amendment (stating this provision includes “various actions in the civil-rights field 
where a party is charged with discriminating unlawfully against a class”). 
 34 See Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982). 
 35 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3), advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment (stating that 
Rule 23(b)(3) “encompasses those cases in which a class action would achieve economies of 
time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, 
without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results”); Kaplan, 
supra note 30, at 389-90. 
 36 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
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commenced by or against the members; (C) the desirability of 
concentrating the litigation in the particular forum; and (D) the 
difficulties of management.37 
The predominance determination “tests whether proposed classes 
are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.”38  
The predominance factor is akin to a “supercommonality” requirement: 
it is met when significant legal issues are common to each class 
member’s cause of action or to the defense of such claims.39  
Predominance has both quantitative components (how many questions 
are common to the class) and qualitative components (are the common 
questions the major questions at issue).  Implicit in predominance is the 
notion that the more commonality, the more economical and efficient 
the class action40 and the more likely that the class has sufficient 
cohesion to justify representative litigation.41 
“That common questions predominate,” however, “is not itself 
sufficient to justify a class action under subdivision (b)(3), for another 
method of handling the litigious situation may be available which has 
greater practical advantages.”42  The superiority requirement operates as 
an open-ended test to determine if the class mechanism is the superior 
factor, when compared to available alternatives.  Alternatives include 
test or model actions and consolidation.43  One common application of 
the superiority analysis is in negative value claims, which are too low-
value for most claimants to litigate separately given the costs of 
litigation but which are viable in the class mechanism, which spreads 
and economizes the costs.44  It also takes on some predominance 
character, for if too many individualized issues exist, the class 
mechanism is not likely to be particularly efficient or manageable.45 
Essentially, Rule 23(b)(3) is a heightened Rule 23(a) standard.  
Together, they ensure both that the baseline prerequisites for 
certification are met and that additional levels of protection for the 
 
 37 Id. at R. 23(b)(3). 
 38 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997). 
 39 Id. (explaining that predominance “trains on the legal or factual questions that qualify each 
class member’s case as a genuine controversy”); see also Romberg, supra note 7, at 287-88. 
 40 Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 2001); FED. R. CIV. P. 
23(b)(3), advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendments (“It is only where this predominance 
exists that economies can be achieved by means of the class-action device.”). 
 41 Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623. 
 42 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3), advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment. 
 43 Id. 
 44 In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 172 F.R.D. 271, 287 (S.D. Ohio 1997); Kaplan, supra 
note 30, at 391.  Representative litigation of negative value claims is also less likely to implicate 
due process concerns because individual class members are more likely to consent to such 
litigation rather than pursue it themselves.  See William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of 
Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371, 394 (2001). 
 45 See Kaplan, supra note 30, at 393. 
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parties and levels of efficiency and economy actually justify class 
treatment. 
 
II.     THE IMPORTANCE OF CERTIFICATION 
 
In many cases, class actions are a plaintiff’s weapon.  Class 
certification can aggregate weak claims with strong ones and mask the 
weak claims in a numbers game.46  Certification also presents the risk of 
an all-or-nothing verdict, which defendants are likely to avoid by 
settling quickly.47  Coupled with courts’ early predisposition for class 
certification as a way to vindicate individual rights,48 the class 
mechanism has become a formidable weapon for plaintiffs. 
These natural litigation pressures have caused class actions to 
increase in size.49  As long as a class action will be maintained, it is in 
both parties’ interests, generally speaking, to pack as many claimants 
into the class as possible.  For defendants, such a scope means resolving 
all of the potential individual claims at once, although defendants may 
attempt to narrow the class to exclude those members whose claims are 
unlikely to succeed individually.  For plaintiffs, a larger class means 
 
 46 See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996) (“Class certification 
magnifies and strengthens the number of unmeritorious claims.”). 
 47 See id. (“The risk of facing an all-or-nothing verdict presents too high a risk, even when the 
probability of an adverse judgment is low.”); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 
1298-300 (7th Cir. 1995); Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 
80 CORNELL L. REV. 941, 958 (1995).  For this reason, some have denigrated certain class 
certifications as judicial blackmail.  See Castano, 84 F.3d at 746; In re GM Corp. Pick-Up Truck 
Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 784-85 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Another problem is that class 
actions create the opportunity for a kind of legalized blackmail: a greedy and unscrupulous 
plaintiff might use the threat of a large class action, which can be costly to the defendant, to 
extract a settlement far in excess of the individual claims’ actual worth.”); Rhone-Poulenc, 51 
F.3d at 1299-300; HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 120 (1973).  
Other courts have recognized that the “[m]ere pressure to settle is not a sufficient reason for a 
court to avoid certifying an otherwise meritorious class action suit.”  Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 
F.3d 1241, 1275 (11th Cir. 2004); In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 
145 (2d Cir. 2001) (“The effect of certification on parties’ leverage in settlement negotiations is a 
fact of life for class action litigants.  While the sheer size of the class in this case may enhance 
this effect, this alone cannot defeat an otherwise proper certification.”). 
 48 Hines, Dangerous Allure, supra note 7, at 576 (stating that “courts soon after the Rule 23 
amendment began resorting to the class action rule to help manage the growing number of mass 
tort cases”); Hines, End-Run, supra note 7, at 709; 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 5, § 1754, at 
56-58.  Particularly in the civil rights arena, courts were quick to use class actions as a vehicle for 
enhancing substantive rights, until the Supreme Court reminded the courts that Rule 23 was there 
for a reason.  See Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982). 
 49 In recent years, some of the largest classes for their respective claims have been certified.  
See, e.g., Klay v. Humana, 382 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2004) (certifying a class of over 600,000 
physicians in one of the largest commercial non-securities litigations); Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., 222 F.R.D. 189 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (certifying a class of over 1.6 million Wal-Mart employees 
in the largest ever employment discrimination class action). 
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less pro rata cost to each individual, a higher award upon a successful 
judgment (a driving incentive for counsel), and increased pressure on 
the defendant to settle.  Even the court has an interest: it must either 
certify a massive class or face an unmanageable inundation of 
individual cases asserting the same general claims.50 
As bigger and bigger classes are crammed into the Rule 23 model, 
the class requirements become more and more difficult to meet.  
Representatives’ claims are less likely to be typical of other class 
members’ claims.  Representatives are also less likely to be able to 
adequately represent so many different class members.  For Rule 
23(b)(2) classes, a defendant’s conduct is less likely to have affected a 
broad class in the same way that it has a narrow class. 
Rule 23(b)(3) classes, particularly mass torts, have the most 
difficulty with broad class actions because the influx of disparate 
individual issues erodes the predominance of common issues and affects 
the manageability of the class mechanism as the superior method for 
resolution.51  For example, in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, a 
products liability case against asbestos companies brought by plaintiffs 
with a broad array of claims and individual issues,52 the Supreme Court 
held that the proposed common factor, “the health consequences of 
asbestos,” could not meet the predominance requirement.53  Similarly, 
many courts have refused to certify Rule 23(b)(3) classes when their 
size became too unwieldy or unmanageable to conduct as a single 
action.54 
 
 50 See Hines, Dangerous Allure, supra note 7, at 570: 
The mass tort dilemma in part results from that specter alone, the sheer number of 
potential mass tort claimants who might file lawsuits.  Often courts are importuned to 
certify a class action, for example, in order to forestall an otherwise inevitable and 
unmanageable inundation of cases asserting injury as a result of an alleged mass tort. 
 51 See id. at 577-81.  Securities fraud and antitrust cases are notable exceptions.  Because of 
the uniformity of harm and legal issues, these cases generally fit easier into the class model than 
other Rule 23(b)(3) cases, despite their large class membership.  See id. at 570 n.22; Amchem 
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997) (“Predominance is a test readily met in certain 
cases . . . alleging . . . securities fraud.”). 
 52 Amchem, 521 U.S. at 624: 
Class members were exposed to different asbestos-containing products, for different 
amounts of time, in different ways, and over different periods.  Some class members 
suffer no physical injury or have only asymptomatic pleural changes, while others 
suffer from lung cancer, disabling asbestosis, or from mesothelioma . . . .  Each has a 
different history of cigarette smoking, a factor that complicates the causation inquiry. 
 53 Id. 
 54 See Hines, Dangerous Allure, supra note 7, at 580-81. 
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III.     ENTER SUBCLASSES 
A.     The Theories of Subclassing at Certification 
 
With so much riding on class certification, and with the increased 
size of classes limiting plaintiffs’ certification prospects, plaintiffs (and 
courts) have turned to Rule 23(c) as a way to save otherwise 
uncertifiable class actions.55  Subsection (c)(4)(B) states: “When 
appropriate . . . a class may be divided into subclasses and each subclass 
treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be construed 
and applied accordingly.”56  Plaintiffs confronted with a broad class that 
may not survive the certification decision may present subclasses as a 
viable option for maintaining the scope of the global class in smaller, 
multiple chunks, even though the global class cannot be certified.57 
This result could be justified by what I call the “replacement 
theory” of subclasses.  Under this theory, if a global class cannot meet 
the certification requirements, the class can be subclassed and each 
subclass treated as one of multiple classes that each are then 
independently tested under Rule 23.  The global class never goes 
through the certification ringer (perhaps because certification would not 
be possible with or without subclasses), but is, instead, simply replaced 
by multiple subclasses. 
A contrary theory, what I call the “contingency theory,” counters 
that there can be no “subclass” without a global class.  In other words, 
the availability of subclasses is contingent on the certifiability of the 
global class.  For example, if no common issue united a putative class, 
that class would fail Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement and be 
uncertifiable, even if proposed subclasses group common issues 
together.  Although each subclass might independently satisfy Rule 23’s 
requirements, the global class still would fail the commonality test, and 
therefore neither the global class nor the subclasses would be entitled to 
certification. 
One role of subclassing consistent with both theories is that 
subclassing could help the global class meet the certification 
requirements.  In other words, a global class that by itself would fail the 
adequacy of representation requirement of Rule 23(a)(4) because of 
divergent interests among class members may be able to meet that 
requirement through subclassing.  By isolating divergent interests in 
separate subclasses with separate representatives, the subclasses resolve 
 
 55 See, e.g., Cent. Wesleyan Coll. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 6 F.3d 177, 190 (4th Cir. 1993). 
 56 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4)(B). 
 57 See, e.g., text accompanying notes 110-118. 
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the global class’s adequacy problems, and then both can be certified 
under Rule 23. 
I assume in this Article that this latter role of subclassing is 
proper.58  It does not, however, affect the critical distinction between the 
replacement theory and contingency theory: whether a global class that 
cannot meet Rule 23’s requirements even with subclasses can be 
replaced by certified subclasses.  That question remains unresolved, as I 
demonstrate next. 
 
B.     Supreme Court 
 
In three cases, the Supreme Court has had—but has not taken—the 
opportunity to address the conflict between the two theories of 
subclassing.  I will describe each separately. 
 
1.     Geraghty 
 
In the first, United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty,59 a 
prisoner brought a class action challenging parole procedures on behalf 
of himself and other prisoners eligible for parole.60  The district court 
denied certification on the ground that individual issues existed and 
because typicality was lacking.61  The court also simultaneously granted 
summary judgment for the defendant.62  Geraghty appealed both issues, 
 
 58 The leading treatises agree that subclasses may be used for this purpose.  See 7A WRIGHT, 
supra note 5, § 1790, at 585 (“Subdivision (c)(4) is particularly helpful in enabling courts to 
restructure complex cases to meet the other requirements for maintaining a class action.”); id. § 
1790, at 268-69 (stating, as an example, that subclassing could help certify a class under the 
manageability requirement of Rule 23(b)(3)); 7A id. § 1764, at 312-13 (“Finally, in considering a 
question under Rule 23(a)(3), the court should keep in mind that it has the authority under Rule 
23(c)(1) and Rule 23(c)(4) to shape the contours of the action by allowing class treatment for only 
some of the issues or by dividing the original class into subclasses.”); id. § 1779, at 151 
(suggesting that Rule 23(c)(4) can be utilized to maintain the superiority of the class mechanism 
for an otherwise unmanageable class); id. § 1780, at 175 (suggesting that the manageability 
determination of Rule 23(b)(3) could be influenced by subclasses); id. § 1765, at 313-25 
(suggesting that a court can cure adequacy problems with subclasses at the certification stage); 5 
MOORE, supra note 5, § 23.24[7], at 23-99 (stating that if typicality is not met, “the court has 
broad authority to . . . divide the class into subclasses . . . so that the representative parties satisfy 
the typicality requirement”); id. § 23.25[6], at 23-147-48 (“If events occurring after class 
certification render a class representative inadequate, a court may remedy the problem 
by . . . certifying subclasses . . . .”). 
 59 445 U.S. 388 (1980). 
 60 Id. at 393. 
 61 Geraghty v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 429 F. Supp. 737, 740-41 (M.D. Pa. 1977). 
 62 Id. 
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but before he could file a brief in the Third Circuit, he was released 
from prison and, therefore, no longer eligible for parole himself.63 
On appeal, the Third Circuit held that Geraghty’s release did not 
moot the litigation or the appeal, vacated the grant of summary 
judgment, and held that the district court erred in failing to consider 
whether subclasses could have alleviated the district court’s concerns.64  
The Third Circuit agreed with the district court that some issues were 
uncommon but concluded that “the district court need not have refused 
class certification in toto because certain claims were inapplicable to the 
entire class.”65  The Third Circuit chastised the district court for failing 
to consider “the powers and duties of the trial court under section 
(c)(4).”66  Under that section, “the trial judge has the power to certify 
certain issues as subject to class adjudication, and to limit overbroad 
classes by the use of sub-classes.”67  In short, the Third Circuit held that 
the district court could have used subclasses to alleviate intra-class 
incompatibilities.68  Accordingly, the Third Circuit remanded for 
consideration of subclasses.69 
The Supreme Court substantially affirmed the Third Circuit.  The 
Court first affirmed the Court of Appeals’ holding that the case was not 
moot.70  Turning to the subclass question, the Court held that the district 
court had no obligation to consider subclasses sua sponte.71  However, 
the Court affirmed the remand order for consideration of subclasses as 
“a proper disposition.”72  The remand to consider subclassing was 
appropriate, the Court reasoned, because the district court had denied 
certification and dismissed the case on the merits at the same time; there 
was therefore no reason for any party or the court to consider 
subclasses.73  The remand would allow the plaintiff, now that the 
adverse merits decision had been vacated, to seek subclasses.74 
 
 63 Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 394. 
 64 Id. at 395. 
 65 Geraghty v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 579 F.2d 238, 252-53 (3d Cir. 1978). 
 66 Id. at 253. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 253-54. 
 69 Id. at 254. 
 70 Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 395-407. 
 71 Id. at 408 (“The court has no sua sponte obligation so to act.”). 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id.: 
Respondent had no real opportunity to request certification of subclasses after the class 
he proposed was rejected.  The District Court denied class certification at the same 
time it rendered its adverse decision on the merits.  Requesting subclass certification at 
that time would have been a futile act.  The District Court was not about to invest effort 
in deciding the subclass question after it had ruled that no relief on the merits was 
available. 
 74 Id. (“The remand merely gives respondent the opportunity to perform his function [of 
seeking subclasses] in the adversary system.”). 
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Neither the contingency theory nor the replacement theory is 
inconsistent with Geraghty.  None of the courts determined that the 
global class was uncertifiable even with subclasses.  Indeed, on remand, 
the district court certified a single class without subclasses.75  In 
addition, the Supreme Court was far more concerned with the mootness 
issue and whether the district court had an independent obligation to 
consider subclasses sua sponte.  It is likely that the propriety of 
subclasses in the first instance received relatively short shrift by the 
Justices.  Thus, Geraghty says nothing about the propriety of certifying 
a global class that fails to meet Rule 23 even with the help of 
subclasses. 
 
2.     Amchem 
 
In the second case, Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,76 the Court 
considered the legitimacy under Rule 23 of a class action certified for 
the purpose of achieving a global settlement of asbestos-related 
claims.77  The putative class included both asbestos victims (or their 
families) who had filed asbestos-related lawsuits and those who had not; 
the class also asserted a variety of state-law claims for relief.78  
Objectors challenged the settlement based on adequacy grounds under 
Rule 23(a)(4), but the district court certified the 23(b)(3) class 
essentially by finding that the proposed settlement was fair and 
adequate under Rule 23(e).79  The district court deemed subclasses 
unnecessary because they would entail additional cost and delay.80 
The Supreme Court reversed because the class failed to meet the 
requirements of Rule 23.81  The Court began, however, by noting: 
“Settlement is relevant to a class certification.”82  One way in which 
settlement matters, explained the Court, is that class requirements 
relevant to trial manageability are not mandated.83  However, the Court 
continued, class requirements designed to ensure adequacy of 
representation “demand undiluted, even heightened, attention in the 
settlement context.”84  The Court reasoned that Rule 23(e), which at that 
 
 75 Geraghty v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 552 F. Supp. 276, 278 (M.D. Pa. 1982), aff’d, 719 F.2d 
1199 (3d Cir. 1983). 
 76 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
 77 Id. at 597. 
 78 Id. at 602-03. 
 79 Id. at 597, 605-08. 
 80 Id. at 608. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. at 619. 
 83 Id. at 620. 
 84 Id. 
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time permitted the settlement of a class if notice is given to all class 
members,85 “was designed to function as an additional requirement, not 
a superseding direction, for the ‘class action’ to which Rule 23(e) refers 
is one qualified for certification under Rule 23(a) and (b).”86  The Court 
reasoned that if certification of a settlement class hinged solely on the 
fairness of the settlement, without regard to the requirements of Rule 
23(a) and (b), “both class counsel and court would be disarmed.  Class 
counsel confined to settlement negotiations could not use the threat of 
litigation to press for a better offer, . . . and the court would face a 
bargain proffered for its approval without benefit of adversarial 
investigation.”87  In addition, Rule 23 contains no authorization for 
courts “to substitute for Rule 23’s certification criteria a standard never 
adopted—that if a settlement is ‘fair,’ then certification is proper.”88  
Applying this strict Rule 23 standard, the Court held that the class failed 
to meet both the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement89 and the 
Rule 23(a)(4) “adequacy” requirement.90 
In the course of its reasoning, the Court discussed subclasses in 
several contexts.  In discussing the adequacy of representation 
deficiency, the Court several times alluded to the lack of subclasses,91 
suggesting that, in the Court’s view, Rule 23(c)(4)(B) could have helped 
the class overcome its divergences to satisfy Rule 23(a)(4).92  This 
commentary supports the theory that subclasses can be used to help an 
otherwise uncertifiable class meet the requirements of Rule 23.  
However, it does not confront the critical question dividing the 
contingency and replacement theories: whether subclasses could have 
 
 85 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (1997) (amended 1988 & 2003) (“A class action shall not be 
dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal 
or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs.”).  
Rule 23(e) has been amended twice since 1997 and no longer contains such a reference to a “class 
action,” though it does retain the requirements of court approval and notice prior to settlement of 
a certified class.  Id. at R. 23(e)(1) (2005). 
 86 Amchem, 521 U.S. at 621. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at 622. 
 89 Id. at 622-23. 
 90 Id. at 625. 
 91 Id. at 626 (stating that “named parties with diverse medical conditions sought to act on 
behalf of a single giant class rather than on behalf of discrete subclasses”); id. at 627 (“Although 
the named parties alleged a range of complaints, each served generally as representative for the 
whole, not for a separate constituency.”); id. (“‘[W]here differences among members of a class 
are such that subclasses must be established, we know of no authority that permits a court to 
approve a settlement without creating subclasses on the basis of consents by members of a unitary 
class, some of whom happen to be members of the distinct subgroups.’”) (quoting In re Joint E. & 
S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 982 F.2d 721, 742-43 (2d Cir. 1992)). 
 92 Id. at 626-27.  The dissent appeared to agree.  Id. at 636 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“These 
differences might warrant subclasses, though subclasses can have problems of their own.”). 
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permitted certification even if the global class still could not satisfy 
Rule 23’s requirements.  Thus, Amchem does not resolve the issue. 
3.     Ortiz 
 
In the third case, Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,93 the Court considered 
the conditions for certifying a mandatory settlement class on a limited 
fund theory under Rule 23(b)(1)(B).94  The Court held that plaintiffs 
must show that the fund is limited by factors other than settlement and 
that the allocation of settlement funds has addressed any internal class 
conflicts.95 
The class comprised persons adversely affected by asbestos in one 
of three ways: all persons with personal injury claims against 
Fibreboard for asbestos exposure who had not yet brought suit or settled 
their claims, those who had dismissed such claims but retained the right 
to bring future actions against Fibreboard, and past, present, and future 
relatives of exposed persons.96  The class excluded claimants with 
actions presently pending against Fibreboard or claimants whose only 
retained right to sue Fibreboard was upon development of an asbestos-
related malignancy.97  The class argued that certification for settlement 
purposes was necessary to ensure that sufficient insurance funds were 
available to compensate the class members.98 
The district court certified the class under Rules 23(a) and 
23(b)(1)(B) and approved the settlement as fair under Rule 23(e), and 
the Fifth Circuit affirmed.99  Both courts found commonality satisfied 
by the class members’ shared interest in securing and equitably 
distributing maximum settlement funds and typicality satisfied by the 
class representatives’ same shared interest.100 
The Supreme Court reversed, stating that “the Fifth Circuit fell 
short in its attention to Amchem’s explanation of the governing legal 
standards.”101  The Court reiterated Amchem’s teaching that “a fairness 
hearing under Rule 23(e) is no substitute for rigorous adherence to those 
 
 93 527 U.S. 815 (1999). 
 94 Id. at 821 (“This case turns on the conditions for certifying a mandatory settlement class on 
a limited fund theory under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1)(B).”). 
 95 Id. (“We hold that applicants for contested certification on this rationale must show that the 
fund is limited by more than the agreement of the parties, and has been allocated to claimants 
belonging within the class by a process addressing any conflicting interests of class members.”). 
 96 Id. at 825-26. 
 97 Id. at 826. 
 98 Id. at 827. 
 99 Id. at 827-30. 
 100 Id. at 829. 
 101 Id. at 831. 
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provisions of the Rule ‘designed to protect absentees.’”102  The Court 
concluded that a fund cannot become limited and certifiable under Rule 
23(b)(1)(B) merely because of the limitations imposed by the agreement 
of the parties; rather, the parties must present independent evidence of 
the limits and insufficencies of the fund, evidence which other parties 
are entitled to challenge.103 
By analogizing to Rule 23(a)(4)’s adequacy requirement,104 the 
Court reasoned that providing objecting class members and other parties 
meaningful opportunity to challenge the settlement and its allocation 
requires fair representation of the opposition groups.105  The Court 
noted that the class failed to include several types of claimants, and that, 
to be maintained as a limited fund under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), the district 
court should have provided the structural protections of Rule 23(c)(4) 
subclasses to maintain equity to all types of claimants.106 
In addition, even those within the class itself were not adequately 
represented by the global class.  The Court stated that 
it is obvious after Amchem that a class divided between holders of 
present and future claims (some of the latter involving no physical 
injury and to claimants not yet born) requires division into 
homogeneous subclasses under Rule 23(c)(4)(B), with separate 
representation to eliminate conflicting interests of counsel . . . .  No 
such procedure was employed here, and the conflict was as contrary 
to the equitable obligation entailed by the limited fund rationale as it 
was to the requirements of structural protection applicable to all class 
actions under Rule 23(a)(4).107 
In other words, the district court erroneously focused on the 
settlement in determining that commonality and typicality were satisfied 
and failed to resolve “potentially conflicting interests of easily 
identifiable categories of claimants . . . by provisional certification of 
subclasses under Rule 23(c)(4), relying instead on its post hoc findings 
at the fairness hearing that these subclasses in fact had been adequately 
represented.”108 
The Court concluded: 
 
 102 Id. at 849 (quoting Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997)). 
 103 Id. at 849-53. 
 104 Id. at 856 n.31 (“This adequacy of representation concern parallels the enquiry required at 
the threshold under Rule 23(a)(4), but as we indicated in Amchem, the same concerns that drive 
the threshold findings under Rule 23(a) may also influence the propriety of the certification 
decision under the subdivisions of Rule 23(b).”) (citing Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623 n.18). 
 105 Id. at 854 (“There are two issues, the inclusiveness of the class and the fairness of 
distributions to those within it.”). 
 106 Id. at 855 (“Finally, as discussed below, even ostensible parity between settling nonclass 
plaintiffs and class members would be insufficient to overcome the failure to provide the 
structural protection of independent representation as for subclasses with conflicting interests.”). 
 107 Id. at 856-57. 
 108 Id. at 831-32. 
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Assuming arguendo that a mandatory, limited fund rationale could 
under some circumstances be applied to a settlement class of tort 
claimants, it would be essential that the fund be shown to be limited 
independently of the agreement of the parties to the action, and 
equally essential under Rule 23(a) and (b)(1)(B) that the class 
include all those with claims unsatisfied at the time of the settlement 
negotiations, with intraclass conflicts addressed by recognizing 
independently represented subclasses. . . . Those separate 
settlements, together with other exclusions from the claimant class, 
precluded adequate structural protection by subclass treatment, 
which was not even afforded to the conflicting elements within the 
class as certified.109 
Ortiz thus contains several allusions to subclasses and their role.  It 
states that subclasses may be necessary to maintain structural 
protections of equity in limited fund cases.  In other words, subclasses 
may be necessary to the Rule 23(b)(1)(B) limited fund determination 
and the Rule 23(a)(4) adequacy determination.  However, like Amchem 
and Geraghty, Ortiz does not directly address the conflict between the 
replacement theory and the contingency theory of subclasses.  Ortiz 
stands only for the principle that subclasses may be necessary to certify 
a global class.  Ortiz did not address the question of whether subclasses 
may be independently certified if the global class is not. 
 
C.     Lower Court Conflicts 
 
Neither theory has been uniformly adopted in the lower courts.  
Some courts have assumed, without directly deciding, that the 
replacement theory is the correct interpretation of Rule 23.  For 
example, in In re Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc.,110 a district court 
confronted a nationwide products liability action against a pacemaker 
company.111  Although the district court recognized that states’ products 
liability laws differ,112 it nevertheless accepted the plaintiffs’ subclass 
proposal to divide the class among states with similar legal standards.  
The plaintiffs proposed two negligence subclasses, four strict liability 
subclasses, and three punitive damages subclasses.113  The court 
proceeded to evaluate—and certify—each individual subclass 
separately114 and even sua sponte created two additional subclasses.115  
 
 109 Id. at 864-65. 
 110 172 F.R.D. 271 (S.D. Ohio 1997). 
 111 Id. at 276, 278. 
 112 Id. at 278. 
 113 Id. at 278-79. 
 114 Id. at 279-95. 
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However, the court did not systematically evaluate the global class for 
compliance with Rule 23, most likely because the legal variations made 
the global class uncertifiable under Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance 
requirement.  Implicitly, Telectronics followed the replacement theory 
of subclasses by certifying subclasses without addressing the 
certifiability of the global class. 
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit, in Klay v. Humana, Inc.,116 
reasoned that although individualized issues would likely predominate 
in a nationwide class alleging state law causes of action, “if the 
applicable state laws can be sorted into a small number of groups, each 
containing materially identical legal standards, then certification of 
subclasses embracing each of the dominant legal standards can be 
appropriate.”117  Klay thus assumed that commonality and 
predominance, factors that the global class in all likelihood could not 
meet, could be circumvented through the use of subclasses.118 
At least one court, however, has unequivocally rejected (though 
without explanation) the replacement theory.  In Sprague v. General 
Motors Corp.,119 the Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, confronted a putative 
class of 50,000 employees claiming violations of ERISA.120  The district 
court certified the class and created four subclasses.121  The Sixth 
Circuit reversed.  The court first found that the putative class failed the 
commonality and typicality requirements.122  In reference to the 
subclasses, the court stated perfunctorily: “The district court’s use of 
subclasses did not solve the problem.  Subclasses are not a substitute 
for compliance with Rule 23.”123  Although the majority made this 
statement only in a footnote, the issue was not merely an aside: at least 
two of the dissenters believed that the use of subclasses could have 
saved certification.124  Nevertheless, the majority gave no inkling as to 
the reasoning underlying its statement. 
The only agency determination I have found that addresses the 
subclass question is an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) opinion, DuBuclet v. Department of Health & Human 
 
 115 Id. at 287. 
 116 382 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 117 Id. at 1261-62. 
 118 For arguments in support of Klay’s flexible approach to Rule 23(c)(4), see Cabraser, supra 
note 7, at 1479-84. 
 119 133 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
 120 Id. at 392-93. 
 121 Id. at 396-97. 
 122 Id. at 397-99. 
 123 Id. at 399 n.9 (emphasis added). 
 124 Id. at 407 (Lively, J., dissenting) (“I believe, further, the ‘typicality’ requirement was met 
by the district court’s creation of four subclasses.”); id. at 414-15 (Martin, C.J., dissenting) 
(suggesting that subclasses could account for the differences in class commonality and typicality). 
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Services.125  The EEOC regulations have the same certification 
requirements as Rule 23(a).126  They also permit subclasses in language 
nearly identical to Rule 23(c)(4)(B).127  In DuBuclet, an EEOC 
Administrative Examiner found that the class complaint failed the 
commonality, typicality, and adequacy tests.128  The Examiner then 
stated:  
Finally, the examiner is not unaware of the regulations which permit 
him to create sub-classes as appropriate.  The purposes of such a 
provision, however, is to allow a class which has previously met 
class action prerequisites to continue after an unforeseen conflict of 
interest arises and in which subclasses are proper corrective 
measures.  It is not to restructure an initially invalid class.129 
Although this statement sets forth the Examiner’s belief that subclasses 
can only be used after a global class has been certified, the Examiner 
did not give any support or other reasoning for his conclusion. 
Thus, although the courts are split as to the role of subclasses in 
certification decisions, no court has comprehensively analyzed the issue 
or given a reasoned resolution of it.  Instead, the courts have tended to 
make assumptions one way or another without providing guidance. 
 
IV.     INTERPRETATION 
 
In the previous Parts, I introduced the two competing theories of 
subclassing—the replacement theory and the contingency theory—and 
demonstrated that no court or commentator has developed a fully 
reasoned view of the correct interpretation.  In this Part, I analyze Rule 
23(c)(4)(B)’s text, context, structure, history, and underlying norms to 
determine which theory is better supported.  I conclude that the 
replacement theory is the better interpretation of Rule 23(c)(4)(B) as 
written and under current court decisions.  There are counterarguments 
in favor of the contingency theory, but, as I explain below, I do not 
believe they outweigh those that support the replacement theory. 
 
A.     Text 
 
 
 125 No. 01820720, 1982 WL 531956 (EEOC Sept. 17, 1982). 
 126 See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.204(d)(2) (2005). 
 127 See id. § 1614.204(d)(6) (“When appropriate, the administrative judge may decide that a 
class be divided into subclasses and that each subclass be treated as a class, and the provisions of 
this section then shall be construed and applied accordingly.”). 
 128 DuBuclet, 1982 WL 531956, at *5-12. 
 129 Id. at *12 (emphasis added). 
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As the Supreme Court has instructed, the interpretation of Rule 23 
begins with its text.130  Rule 23(c)(4)(B) states: “When appropriate . . . a 
class may be divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a 
class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be construed and applied 
accordingly.”131 
Taking the last part first, the phrase “construed and applied 
accordingly” seems straightforward.132  When a court divides a class 
into subclasses, each subclass, to be maintained, separately must satisfy 
the requirements of Rule 23.  Most courts have construed this provision 
so.133 
The more difficult question, for present purposes, is when a court 
can divide a class into subclasses.  The Rules do not give any explicit 
guidance as to when it might be appropriate to do so.  Indeed, Rule 
23(c)(4) is tautologically unhelpful; its direct response is, well, “[w]hen 
appropriate.”134  The most guidance that can be gleaned from this phrase 
is that courts have some discretion to use Rule 23(c)(4) to further the 
goals and protections of Rule 23. 
One textual clue is that it must be a “class” that is divided into 
subclasses.  One could interpret the term “class” to mean a class that is 
itself certifiable under Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b).  This interpretation 
would support the contingency theory because it posits that a certifiable 
 
 130 See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997) (stating that interpretation 
starts with “the Rule as now composed”). 
 131 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4)(B). 
 132 The phrase certainly applies to subclasses.  See Edward H. Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to 
the Rulemaking Process, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13, 51, 56 (1996) (noting that the Advisory 
Committee even considered an amendment to limit the phrase to Rule 23(c)(4)(B)). 
 133 See, e.g., Cent. Wesleyan Coll. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 6 F.3d 177, 189 (4th Cir. 1994); 
Retired Chicago Police Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 7 F.3d 584, 599 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Subclasses 
must satisfy the class action requirements . . . .”); Betts v. Reliable Collection Agency, 659 F.2d 
1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 1981) (“[E]ach subclass must independently meet the requirements of Rule 
23 . . . .”); Johnson v. Am. Credit Co., 581 F.2d 526, 532 (5th Cir. 1978); 1 NEWBERG, supra note 
5, § 3:9, at 267-68 (stating that “it is generally settled that each subclass must independently 
satisfy class action criteria”); 3 id. § 9:48, at 422-23 (“Subclasses, however, must meet the same 
class action requirements as any other defined class before certification of the subclass is 
proper.”); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 7, § 33.33, at 340 (“Each class or 
subclass must independently satisfy all the prerequisites of Rules 23(a) and (b).”); 5 MOORE, 
supra note 5, § 23.86[1][c], at 23-352 (“Each subclass must independently satisfy the class action 
requirements of Rule 23 before it may be certified.”); 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 5, § 1790, at 
284 (stating that “each subclass must independently meet the requirements of Rule 23 for 
maintenance of a class action”).  Interestingly, however, there is some dispute as to whether each 
individual subclass must satisfy the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a).  Compare 1 
NEWBERG, supra note 5, § 3:9, at 268 (asserting that “if the subclass members are also members 
of the larger, already certified class, they may not be required to satisfy independently the 
numerosity requirement”), with 5 id. § 17:9, at 320-21 (describing a split in court authority on this 
issue), and 5 MOORE, supra note 5, § 23.86[1][c], at 23-353 n.14 (same), and MANUAL FOR 
COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 7 § 32.53, at 340 (“The creation of a number of subclasses 
may result in some that are too small to satisfy the numerosity requirement . . . .”). 
 134 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4). 
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class is logically antecedent (or at least simultaneous) to any attempt to 
subclass. 
But the rest of Rule 23 does not support that interpretation.  The 
term “class” is used throughout Rule 23 detached from connotations of 
certifiability.  Rule 23(a), for example, assumes that the term “class” 
describes something that exists prior to, and may even exist without, 
certification: “One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as 
representative parties on behalf of all only if [the prerequisites are 
met].”135  Under this formulation, some “classes” will not meet the 
prerequisites and will be uncertifiable.136 
This does not mean that a mere “class,” referenced as such in the 
Rules, cannot also be a certifiable or certified class action (as it must in 
certain provisions of Rule 23(c)137); it just means that the term “class” 
does not necessarily refer to a certifiable class.  This interpretation of 
the term “class” in Rule 23(c)(4) thus supports the replacement theory 
because an uncertified class may be divided into subclasses. 
Another textual clue is the term “subclass.”  The Rules do not 
define the term.  Nor does Black’s Law Dictionary.  But the ordinary 
meaning is not difficult to divine.  A “subclass” most naturally means a 
subdivision or subset of a class.  This is confirmed by the Rule, which 
states that “a class may be divided into subclasses.”138  One might fairly 
reason that for a subclass to remain a subclass after it is created, the 
class must continue to exist; otherwise, the subclass would simply 
become a new class.  There can be, in other words, no subclass without 
a class. 
There are two problems with this line of reasoning.  The first, 
discussed above, is that the term “class,” as used in Rule 23(c)(4)(B), is 
not restricted to certifiable classes.  Thus, just because the global class 
cannot be certified does not mean that it ceases to be a class.  The global 
class remains, albeit uncertified, and subclasses (certified or not) may 
 
 135 Id. at R. 23(a). 
 136 One could argue that the term “class action,” rather than the term “class,” is restricted to 
certifiable classes.  See, e.g., id. (entitled “Class Actions”) (emphasis added); id. at R. 23(a) 
(entitled “Prerequisites to a Class Action”); id. at R. 23(b) (stating that an action “may be 
maintained as a class action” if the prerequisites are met; id. at R. 23(c) (entitled “Determining by 
Order Whether to Certify a Class Action”); id. at R. 23(h) (applying to “an action certified as a 
class action”); id. at R. 23(c)(1), advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendments (stating that if a 
class action certification is later determined to be unsound, “the action should be stripped of its 
character as a class action . . . . [and] becomes a nonclass action . . .”).  But see Class Action 
Fairness Act of 2005, 109 Pub. L. 2, 119 Stat. 4 (defining “class action” as “any civil action filed” 
under Rule 23 or an analogous state court rule, without mentioning certification). 
 137 Id. at R. 23(c)(1)(B) (“An order certifying a class action must define the class and the class 
claims, issues, or defenses . . . .”); id. at R. 23(c)(2)(A) (“For any class certified under Rule 
23(b)(1) or (2), the court may direct appropriate notice to the class.”). 
 138 Id. at R. 23(c)(4)(B). 
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then comfortably exist within the ordinary meaning of the term 
“subclass.” 
The second problem is that Rule 23(c)(4)(B) specifically 
contemplates the transformation of subclasses into ordinary classes by 
providing that each subclass is then “treated as a class.”139  This key 
provision strongly supports the replacement theory because it naturally 
reads to permit a court to create subclasses and then essentially 
eliminate the “sub” by treating them as multiple classes and 
disregarding the global class.  Rule 23(c) further supports the 
replacement theory because its title groups the topic “Multiple Classes” 
with “Subclasses.”140  Oddly enough, the text of the Rule does not 
mention “multiple classes.”  But the Advisory Committee Notes 
explain, “Two or more classes may be represented in a single action.  
Where a class is found to include subclasses divergent in interest, the 
class may be divided correspondingly, and each subclass treated as a 
class.”141  This explanation supports the ability of a court to take a 
global class, divide it into subclasses, and then treat the subclasses as 
multiple “classes” by disregarding the global class originally presented.  
Thus, the text of Rule 23(c)(4)(B) supports the replacement theory, not 
the contingency theory. 
Contingency theorists might argue that the phrase “each subclass 
treated as a class” is only important for purposes of the following 
phrase: “and the provisions of this rule shall then be construed and 
applied accordingly.”142  In other words, the true import of Rule 
23(c)(4)(B) is that subclasses must independently satisfy Rule 23(a) and 
(b), and the only way to link subclasses to the certification requirements 
is to call them “classes” for the purposes of certification. 
Though plausible, this interpretation is unlikely.  The text does not 
by its terms limit the term “class” only for the purposes of imposing the 
certification requirements.  In addition, far less convoluted phrasing 
would have accomplished that goal.  For example, the drafters could 
have written: “When appropriate . . . a class may be divided into 
subclasses . . . and the provisions of this rule shall then be construed and 
applied [to those subclasses].”143  In short, the phrase “each subclass 
treated as a class” supports the transformation of subclasses into 
multiple classes.  For these reasons, the text of Rule 23(c)(4)(B) 
strongly supports the replacement theory. 
 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. at R. 23(c). 
 141 Id. at R. 23(c)(4), advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. at R. 23(c)(4)(B). 
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B.     Context 
 
The subclassing provision is intertwined with the issue class 
provision.  Rule 23(c)(4) reads, in full: “When appropriate (A) an action 
may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to 
individual issues, or (B) a class may be divided into subclasses and each 
subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be 
construed and applied accordingly.”144  Because the two provisions are 
intertwined, the interpretation of the scope of issue classes under Rule 
23(c)(4)(A) could help interpret the scope of subclasses under Rule 
23(c)(4)(B). 
Although commentators do not agree on the proper interpretation 
of Rule 23(c)(4)(A),145 a growing majority of courts supports an 
interpretation of Rule 23(c)(4)(A) that permits certification of particular 
issues even if the global action cannot itself satisfy the certification 
requirements.  The adoption of such a view supports a similar 
interpretation of Rule 23(c)(4)(B). 
For example, in Gunnells v. Healthplan Services, Inc.,146 
purchasers and beneficiaries of a multi-employer health care plan 
brought class action claims growing out of the plan’s collapse.  The 
Fourth Circuit held that a class action could be maintained as to a 
particular issue (a particular claim brought by the class) under Rule 
23(c)(4)(A) despite finding that the global class failed to satisfy the 
Rule 23(b)(3) requirement for all claims.147 
The dissent took the position that “even in cases involving the 
certification of issue-only classes, the common issues must predominate 
over questions affecting only individual members of the class in the 
context of the action as a whole,”148 and that Rule 23(b) serves as the 
“gates” through which every action must first pass before Rule 23(c) is 
to be considered.149  The majority, of course, disagreed.  It viewed the 
dissent’s sequentialist argument as backwards: Rule 23(c)(4)(A) permits 
the bringing or maintenance of an issue class before application of 
Rules 23(a) and (b).150  It also reasoned that if Rule 23(c)(4) could only 
be considered after certification, then the “manageability” provisions of 
 
 144 Id. at R. 23(c)(4). 
 145 See supra note 7. 
 146 348 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 147 Id. at 428-34. 
 148 Id. at 448 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 149 Id. at 449 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).  I note that the dissent took the view that not even the 
contingency theory does—that Rule 23(c)(4) cannot even help a global class itself meet the 
certification requirements. 
 150 Id. at 439. 
  
2376 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 27:5 
 
Rule 23(c)(4) could have no impact on the manageability requirement 
of Rule 23(b)(3), a result at odds with the purpose of Rule 23(c)(4) in 
the first place.151  Finally, it relied on prior Fourth Circuit precedent.152 
In Chiang v. Veneman,153 the Third Circuit adopted a similar 
interpretation of Rule 23(c)(4)(A).  The Department of Agriculture 
appealed from the certification of a class of minorities and women from 
the Virgin Islands discriminated against in the administration of loan 
programs.154  The court noted that two issues were ripe for class 
adjudication even though individual issues could predominate in other 
areas.155  Accordingly, it isolated issue classes under Rule 23(c)(4)(A) 
and proceeded to determine that Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance 
requirement was met with respect to those issues.156 
The Second and Ninth Circuits have hinted at their support for this 
interpretation.  In Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc.,157 a district court 
certified, without elaboration, a nationwide class and subclass in a 
products liability case against the manufacturer of a drug used to treat 
epilepsy.158  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit stated:  
Implicit in the satisfaction of the predominance test is the notion that 
the adjudication of common issues will help achieve judicial 
economy. . . .  Even if the common questions do not predominate 
over the individual questions so that class certification is warranted, 
Rule 23 authorizes the district court in appropriate cases to isolate 
the common issues under Rule 23(c)(4)(A) and proceed with class 
treatment of these particular issues.159 
And in Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co.,160 the Second 
Circuit, while not directly addressing the issue itself, directed lower 
courts to pay heed to the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Valentino.161 
 
 151 Id. (“Thus, under the dissent’s reading of Rule 23, a court could only use subsection (c)(4) 
to manage cases that the court had already determined would be manageable without 
consideration of subsection (c)(4).  This reading leaves subsection (c)(4)(A) without any practical 
application, thereby rendering it superfluous.”). 
 152 See, e.g., Cent. Wesleyan Coll. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 6 F.3d 177, 185 (4th Cir. 1992) 
(quoting In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 728 (4th Cir. 1989)): 
This court also has admonished district courts to “take full advantage of the provision 
in [Rule 23(c)(4)] permitting class treatment of separate issues” in order “to promote 
the use of the class device and to reduce the range of disputed issues” in complex 
litigation. . . .  [I]f an action “includes multiple claims, one or more of which might 
qualify as a certifiable class claim, the court may separate such claims from other 
claims in the action and certify them under the provisions of subdivision (c)(4).”  
 153 385 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 154 Id. at 259. 
 155 Id. at 267. 
 156 Id. at 273. 
 157 97 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 158 Id. at 1228. 
 159 Id. at 1234. 
 160 267 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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The lone contrarian is the Fifth Circuit.  In Castano v. American 
Tobacco Co.,162 the Fifth Circuit stated, in the context of an issue class 
action under Rule 23(c)(4)(A): 
A district court cannot manufacture predominance through the 
nimble use of subdivision (c)(4).  The proper interpretation of the 
interaction between subdivisions (b)(3) and (c)(4) is that a cause of 
action, as a whole, must satisfy the predominance requirement of 
(b)(3) and that (c)(4) is a housekeeping rule that allows courts to 
sever the common issues for a class trial. . . .  Reading rule 23(c)(4) 
as allowing a court to sever issues until the remaining common issue 
predominates over the remaining individual issues would eviscerate 
the predominance requirement of rule 23(b)(3); the result would be 
automatic certification in every case where there is a common issue, 
a result that could not have been intended.163 
The Fifth Circuit has twice reaffirmed Castano,164 though there is 
some indication that it is striking a more nuanced position.  In Bolin v. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co.,165 the Fifth Circuit supported certification on a 
claim-by-claim basis, rather than a holistic basis, and noted that “Rule 
23(c)(4) explicitly recognizes the flexibility that courts need in class 
certification by allowing certification ‘with respect to particular issues’ 
the division of the class into subclasses.”166 
Despite Castano, a solid majority of circuit courts167 agrees that 
Rule 23(c)(4)(A) can be used to certify a class with respect to particular 
issues even if the global action is not itself certifiable.  Reading Rule 
23(c)(4)(A) and Rule 23(c)(4)(B) in pari materia,168 that interpretation 
of issue classes suggests that a similar interpretation should apply to 
 
 161 Id. at 167 n.12. 
 162 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 163 Id. at 745 n.21 (citation omitted). 
 164 See Smith v. Texaco, Inc., 263 F.3d 394, 409 (5th Cir. 2001), withdrawn, 281 F.3d 477 
(5th Cir. 2002); Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 422 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 165 231 F.3d 970 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 166 Id. at 976. 
 167 District courts have also split.  Compare Taylor v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 205 F.R.D. 
43 (D.D.C. 2002) (certifying common issues in a hybrid class action), and Emig v. Am. Tobacco 
Co., 184 F.R.D. 379, 395 (D. Kan. 1998) (explaining that Rule 23(c)(4)(A) permits “adjudication 
of any issues common to the class even though the entire litigation may not satisfy the 
requirements of Rule 23”), with Rink v. Cheminova, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 648 (M.D. Fla. 2001) 
(refusing to certify an issue class), and Cohn v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 189 F.R.D. 209 (D. 
Conn. 1999) (same). 
 168 The cannon of statutory construction in pari materia (literally, in the same matter) instructs 
a court to construe provisions pertaining to the same subject matter as if they were one law.  See 
Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243 (1972); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 807 (8th ed. 
2004).  The Supreme Court has read certain closely-tied provisions of statutes in pari materia to 
aid one provision’s interpretation.  See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 711-
12 (1996) (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) should be read in pari materia with § 1447(d)). 
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subclassing.  Accordingly, the current circuit caselaw on Rule 
23(c)(4)(A) supports the replacement theory for Rule 23(c)(4)(B). 
 
C.     Structure 
 
In contrast to the support for the replacement theory provided by 
the text and context of Rule 23(c)(4)(B), the location of the subclass 
provision in Rule 23(c), in the midst of other procedural and 
housekeeping provisions, lends support for the contingency theory.  In 
this section, I give credit to that argument but explain why, on balance, 
this structural argument is not as persuasive as the textual argument. 
As a general matter, Rules 23(a) and (b) are the substantive 
requirements for class certification.  Rule 23(a) lists the “prerequisites” 
to a class action.169  If those “prerequisites” are “satisfied,” then the 
“action may be maintained as a class action” if one of the Rule 23(b) 
requirements is also satisfied.170  Rules 23(a) and (b) contain the nuts 
and bolts of certification. 
Rule 23(c), in contrast, is not a “prerequisite” to anything.  It deals 
with a hodgepodge of housekeeping matters, as its title illustrates: 
“Determining by Order Whether to Certify a Class Action; Appointing 
Class Counsel; Notice and Membership in Class; Judgment; Multiple 
Classes and Subclasses.”171  Subsection (c)(1), for example, requires a 
court to order certification, if warranted, “at an early practicable 
time,”172 to define the class, and to appoint class counsel.173  Rule 
23(c)(1) also permits a certification order to be “altered or amended 
before final judgment.”174  Rule 23(c)(2) pertains to notice to class 
members.175  Rule 23(c)(3) directs a judgment to specify the class 
 
 169 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 170 Id. at R. 23(b). 
 171 Id. at R. 23(c). 
 172 Id. at R. 23(c)(1)(A). 
 173 Id. at R. 23(c)(1)(B). 
 174 Id. at R. 23(c)(1)(C). 
 175 Id. at R. 23(c)(2). 
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members to which it pertains.176  In the midst of these are the 
subclassing and issue class provisions of Rule 23(c)(4).177 
The subclassing provision is placed in the management provisions 
of Rule 23(c), rather than in the certification requirement provisions of 
Rule 23(a) or Rule 23(b).  As recited above, Rule 23(c) deals with 
housekeeping issues and due process protections, not class certification 
requirements.  It most naturally comes into play only after the 
“prerequisites” of Rule 23(a) have been met and perhaps even after a 
class action is deemed “maintainable” under Rule 23(b).  Thus, the 
location of the subclassing authorization, in Rule 23(c) rather than in 
Rule 23(a) or Rule 23(b), supports the contingency theory—that Rule 
23(c) applies only after (or at least at the same time that) a class has met 
the requirements of Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b).178  The replacement 
theory, in other words, puts the cart before the horse. 
This is a plausible argument, and at the very least it should serve as 
a call to the Rules Committee and the Court for clarification of the 
proper scope of Rule 23(c)(4).  Ultimately, however, it less persuasive 
than the textual argument for three reasons. 
First, the replacement theory is not necessarily any more a 
“certification” issue than it is a “management” issue.  Indeed, one could 
argue that the replacement theory is more of a management issue than a 
certification issue because it merely focuses, tracking the text of Rule 
23(c)(4)(B), on dividing a global class (certifiable or not) into 
subclasses.  Certification comes into play only tangentially—as the 
basis for maintaining them once they are defined. 
Second, Rule 23(c) itself speaks to certification issues and so 
cannot be restricted to non-certification “management” issues.  Rule 
23(c)(4) states that for subclasses (and likely issue classes as well), “the 
provisions of this rule [i.e., Rules 23(a) and (b)] shall then be construed 
 
 176 Id. at R. 23(c)(2)(B).  The rule states that: 
The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b)(1) or 
(b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and describe those whom the 
court finds to be members of the class.  The judgment in an action maintained as a 
class action under subdivision (b)(3), whether or not favorable to the class, shall 
include and specify or describe those to whom the notice provided in subdivision (c)(2) 
was directed, and who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be 
members of the class. 
Id. 
 177 Id. at R. 23(c)(4). 
 178 At least one commentator and one court have adopted this same reasoning for the 
conclusion that Rule 23(c)(4)(A) is not a certification substitute for failure to meet Rule 
23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement.  See, e.g., Hines, End-Run, supra note 7, at 712; Castano v. 
Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 745 n.21 (5th Cir. 1996).  However, as I mentioned, the 
commentary is not in consensus on this issue, see supra note 7, and a majority of courts have 
rejected it, see supra text accompanying notes 146-167. 
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and applied accordingly.”179  As I mentioned above, this provision has 
been interpreted to mean that each subclass (or issue class) must then 
satisfy Rules 23(a) and (b) before being certified.180  If so, then it 
addresses certification at least as much as the replacement theory does.  
Indeed, by forcing a court to address Rule 23(a) and (b) certification 
issues after creating subclasses under Rule 23(c), Rule 23(c) itself puts 
the cart before the horse.  In addition, Rule 23(c)(1) also speaks to 
certification issues, rather than “management” issues, because it 
addresses when certification should be determined.181 
Third, the step-wise theory that Rules 23(a) and (b) are “gateways” 
through which the case must pass before reaching Rule 23(c) manifests 
a rigidity that is contrary to the flexibility inherent in Rule 23.  
Certification is designed to be a give-and-take process: Rule 23(c)(1)(C) 
allows a court to revisit certification issues at any time before final 
judgment.182  And the manageability provisions of Rule 23(c) must be 
designed to work in tandem with the requirement of superiority of Rule 
23(b)(3); it would be odd for a court confronted with a Rule 23(b)(3) 
class to determine whether or not the class is manageable without 
looking to the Rule 23(c) provisions specifically addressing 
manageability issues. 
In short, the argument based on structure—though I give it much 
credit—is substantially undermined by the text and spirit of Rule 23, 
and therefore it simply does not balance the far clearer textual support 
for the replacement theory. 
 
D.     Drafting History 
 
The intentions of the drafters are an important consideration in 
understanding the meaning of the subclassing provision,183 particularly 
because Rule 23(c)(4)(B) has not substantially changed since enacted in 
1966.184  As the Supreme Court has instructed, “we are bound to follow 
 
 179 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4). 
 180 See supra note 132-133 and accompanying text. 
 181 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A).  Before the 2003 amendments to Rule 23(c), Rule 23(c)(1) 
even permitted “conditional” certification, which clearly allowed certification before the 
conditions of Rule 23(a) and (b) had been met.  Id. at R. 23(c)(1) (1966) (amended 2003). 
 182 Id. at R.. 23(c)(1)(C). 
 183 See Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1152-69 (2002) (arguing for interpretation based on 
drafter intent).  But see John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, 
and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 373 (2000) (criticizing Ortiz 
for favoring “rule formalism” over “due process”). 
 184 Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4) (2005), with id. at R. 23(c)(3) (1966). 
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Rule 23 as we understood it upon its adoption.”185  The Advisory 
Committee’s Notes are indices of the drafters’ intentions,186 as are the 
sentiments of the Committee’s members and its official reporter, 
Benjamin Kaplan.187  Unfortunately, neither the Rule’s commentary nor 
the drafting history sheds much light on the meaning of subclassing’s 
role in certification.  At best, they only modestly support the 
replacement theory. 
 
1.     The Advisory Committee’s Notes 
 
As noted above, the original commentary on Rule 23(c)(4)(B), 
though sparse, tends to support the replacement theory because it tracks 
the text by recognizing that “[t]wo or more classes may be represented 
in a single action,” and that when subclasses are created, each is “treated 
as a class.”188 
In fairness, other portions of the Advisory Committee’s Notes 
could be read to undermine their support for the replacement theory.  In 
the commentary on Rule 23(b)(3), the Committee suggested that mass 
accidents usually should not be certified because individualized issues 
generally predominate over the common issues, and such a class action 
would degenerate into multiple lawsuits individually tried.189  The 
Committee did not suggest, as the replacement theory does, that a 
possible solution would be to subclass until common issues 
predominated over individual issues in each subclass.  One might have 
expected the Committee to spend more time discussing Rule 
23(c)(4)(B)’s application to Rule 23(b)(3) classes had the Committee 
strongly believed in the replacement theory.190  Thus, the Advisory 
 
 185 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 861 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 
U.S. 591, 613-25 (1997) (looking to the Advisory Committee’s drafting history); see also Linda 
S. Mullenix, Abandoning the Federal Class Action Ship: Is There Smoother Sailing for Class 
Actions in Gulf Waters?, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1709, 1724-25 (2000) (interpreting Ortiz as favoring an 
“originalist stance for Rule 23”). 
 186 See Struve, supra note 183, at 1156 (stating that the “most logical evidence of such intent 
can be found in the Rule’s text and Advisory Committee Notes”); 4 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 5, 
§ 1029 (stating that the Notes provide “something akin to a ‘legislative history’ of the rules”). 
 187 See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 833, 834, 842-45 (citing the published views of Benjamin Kaplan); 
id. at 882 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority properly relied on Kaplan’s views for 
explanation); id. at 844 & n.20 (citing Committee meeting excerpts); id. at 834 n.14 (citing a 
letter from Kaplan to another Committee member); 4 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 5, § 1029 
(noting the respect given the views of individual Committee members). 
 188 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4), advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment. 
 189 Id. at R. 23(b)(3), advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment. 
 190 More recent commentary added to Rule 23(b)(3) states that “[f]ollowing a determination of 
liability, for example, proceedings to define the remedy may demonstrate the need to amend the 
class definition or subdivide the class.”  Id. at R. 23(c), advisory committee’s notes to 2003 
amendment.  This description is unhelpful in resolving the proper role for subclasses, for it 
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Committee’s Notes could be read to undermine the support for the 
replacement theory. 
However, this reading relies on the tenuous inference that the 
Committee did not discuss the issue in more depth because it did not 
accept the replacement theory.  The Committee could have declined to 
discuss Rule 23(c)(4)(B) in that portion of the commentary for any 
number of reasons, including for the reason that it wished to focus on 
the meaning of Rule 23(b)(3), not Rule 23(c)(4).  In addition, a similar 
inferential argument could be made in support of the replacement 
theory: if the text supports the replacement theory but the Committee 
did not, one would have expected the Committee to have clarified Rule 
23(c)(4)(B) by stating that subclasses should not be considered unless 
the entire action could be maintained under Rule 23(b)(3). 
On balance, the Advisory Committee’s Notes provide some 
support for the replacement theory, but only because they confirm the 
textual interpretation. 
 
2.     Rules Committee Drafting Record 
 
Despite the volume of drafting history primary source materials 
kept on file at the Rules Committee Support Office,191 clues from the 
drafting history are nearly as sparse.  The drafters spoke little of the 
subclassing section.  The only discussions I have found that pertain 
specifically to the subclassing language occur during some of the very 
first comments on the new section. 
In the most prominent discussion of Rule 23(c)(4), Professor 
Charles Alan Wright wrote to Reporter Benjamin Kaplan, complaining 
that Rule 23(c)(4) “seems to me the kind of picky detail which does not 
require statement in the rule” and questioning whether the provision 
was in accordance with the law, although he did not elaborate as to 
why.192  Responding, Kaplan and Committee Member Albert M. Sacks 
wrote:  
 
appears to assume that the class has already been certified. 
 191 These materials are available on microfiche at the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts 
in Washington, D.C.  Fortunately, many that I reference here have been appended to an article by 
Professor Laura Hines.  See Hines, End-Run, supra note 7, at 765-70.  For convenience, I add a 
citation to her article for these primary source materials where appropriate. 
 192 See Letter from Prof. Charles Alan Wright to Benjamin Kaplan, at 3 (Mar. 30, 1963), 
reprinted in COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 1935-88, CONGRESSIONAL 
INFORMATION SERVICE RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, No. CI-7001, at 41 
[hereinafter U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, No. CI-7001]; see also Hines, End-Run, supra note 7, 
at 765-66. 
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Certainly it is the law: . . . the reality of the class-subclass situation is 
manifested when courts, speaking of inadequacy of representation, 
observe that besides the interests shared by all members of the class, 
there are special interests shared only by particular groupings within 
the class.  We think [the subclassing provision], although making 
obvious points, is useful for the sake of clarity and completeness.193   
Upon receiving that response, Professor Wright withdrew his objection 
and accepted Kaplan’s assertion that the subclassing provision language 
accurately reflected existing law, although he noted that he still 
harbored lingering (if unexplained) doubts.194 
Kaplan’s example illustrates the quintessential subclassing 
problem—adequacy of representation—and suggests that subclassing 
can isolate those subgroups with different interests in order to provide 
effective representation for them.  The contingency and replacement 
theories are not concerned with this power of subclassing. 
Thus, one plausible interpretation of this brief dialogue is that 
Kaplan’s example illustrates just one of the most common ways the 
subclassing provision can be effective but by no means is indicative of 
any limitations on the provision.  Kaplan does not go so far as to 
suggest that the subclassing provision cannot save a global class if it 
failed other class requirements. 
Indeed, in a later article, Kaplan lauded the broad power of judicial 
initiative to find creative solutions to class questions, stating:  
The reform of Rule 23 was intended to shake the law of class actions 
free of abstract categories . . . and to rebuild the law on functional 
lines responsive to those recurrent life patterns which call for mass 
litigation through representative parties . . . .  And whereas the old 
Rule had paid virtually no attention to the practical administration of 
 
 193 See Memorandum from Benjamin Kaplan to the Chairman and Members of the Committee 
(Sept. 12, 1963), reprinted in U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, No. CI-7001, supra note 192, at 52; 
see also Hines, End-Run, supra note 7, at 766-68.  In the only other elaboration of subclassing 
that I could find in the annals, Kaplan wrote: “Then we have a further provision about the 
division of classes into sub-classes, which looks to the proper conduct of the suit.  You may have 
a group of people who are aligned in interest as to certain matters, but may split up as to others, 
and in such a case, one can speak properly of classes and sub-classes.”  Transcript of Civil Rules 
Advisory Committee Meeting, Amendment Proposal EE—Class Actions, reprinted in 
COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 1935-88, CONGRESSIONAL INFORMATION 
SERVICE RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, No. CI-7104, at 53 [hereinafter U.S. 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, No. CI-7104] (remarks of Reporter Benjamin Kaplan); see also Hines, 
End-Run, supra note 7, at 768-69. 
 194 See Letter from Prof. Charles Alan Wright to Benjamin Kaplan, at 4 (Sept. 23, 1963), 
reprinted in COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 1935-88, CONGRESSIONAL 
INFORMATION SERVICE RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, No. CI-7002, at 17 (“I 
withdraw my objection to Rule 23(c)[(4)].  When Ben Kaplan and Al Sacks tell me that ‘certainly 
it is the law,’ that settles that it is indeed the law, and I rue my own ignorance in having earlier 
expressed doubt. . . .  Despite what you now say, I remain in dubitante about 23(c)[(4)] . . . .”); 
see also Hines, End-Run, supra note 7, at 768. 
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class actions, the revised Rule dwelt long on this matter—not, to be 
sure, by prescribing detailed procedures, but by confirming the 
courts’ broad powers and inviting judicial initiative.195 
Though he did not mention Rule 23(c)(4) specifically in this passage, 
such sentiments suggest that courts can use such management 
provisions broadly and in ways that would support the replacement 
theory. 
In addition, Professor Wright’s treatise on civil procedure adopts a 
similarly broad view of Rule 23 and, in fact, advocates the replacement 
theory.196  This would suggest that Professor Wright ultimately 
understood both Kaplan to mean and the law to be that courts could 
subdivide uncertifiable classes and just address certification of the 
subclasses. 
On the other hand, Kaplan, in his discussion with Professor 
Wright, explicitly referred to a global class that had already satisfied the 
commonality test.  If Kaplan envisioned a subclassing mechanism that 
could replace the global class with smaller subclasses, the fact that the 
global class satisfied the commonality test would be irrelevant.  Because 
he mentioned it, one could argue that Kaplan believed it necessary that 
the global class at least meet the commonality requirement for the 
subclassing mechanism to provide relief. 
Also, what seems abundantly clear is that Kaplan and the 
Committee Members agreed that the subclassing provision was 
somewhat “obvious” and merely a “detail.”197  Even in his later 
writings, when Kaplan explicated the new Rule 23 in some detail, he 
devoted nothing more than a passing footnote to Rule 23(c)(4).198  If the 
drafters considered Rule 23(c)(4)(B) to encompass the replacement 
theory, one might expect to find discussion of subclassing far more 
extensive and characterization of subclassing as something far more 
powerful than a “detail” in the drafting history.199 
As argued above, however, this line of inferential reasoning is 
somewhat uncertain, and I am hesitant to credit it in light of the other 
evidence supporting the replacement theory.  On balance, the most that 
can be said about the dialogue between Kaplan and Wright during the 
 
 195 Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 497 (1969). 
 196 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 5, § 1778, at 546 (suggesting that subclassing could make 
the common issues in the subdivided class action predominate for the purposes of Rule 23(b)(3)). 
 197 Transcript of Civil Rules Advisory Committee Meeting, Amendment Proposal EE—Class 
Actions, reprinted in U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, No. CI-7104, supra note193, at 53 (remarks of 
Reporter Benjamin Kaplan); Letter from Prof. Charles Alan Wright to Benjamin Kaplan, at 3 
(Mar. 30, 1963), reprinted in U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, No. CI-7001, supra note 192, at 41; 
see also Hines, End-Run, supra note 7, at 765-66, 768-69. 
 198 Kaplan, supra note 30, at 393 n.144. 
 199 Cf. Hines, End-Run, supra note 7, at 754 (making the same argument for the Advisory 
Committee Notes and Rule 23(c)(4)(A)). 
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drafting committee’s work on Rule 23 is that it sheds little light on the 
proper meaning or role of subclassing. 
 
E.     Efficiency and Workability 
 
As with the interpretation of the drafting history, the effects of the 
two competing interpretations on the efficiency200 and workability of 
class actions do not strongly support either theory.  Take the following 
scenario, for example.  Plaintiff seeks the broadest class possible.  At 
certification, Plaintiff acknowledges that his global class cannot meet 
the Rule 23 requirements with or without subclasses, but argues that the 
class should be subdivided into subclasses A, B, and C, which each 
independently satisfy Rule 23.  If a court follows the replacement 
theory, it will certify subclasses A, B, and C, and the case will proceed 
in the same scope that Plaintiff initially sought, albeit in three chunks.  
If, however, a court follows the contingency theory, it will refuse to 
certify any class and proceed only with Plaintiff’s individual claims.  
Non-certification, however, does not prevent different plaintiffs from 
simply refiling three independent class actions equivalent in scope to 
the subclasses A, B, and C.  Indeed, if the joinder rules permit it, the 
original Plaintiff could simply amend his complaint to allege three 
different classes rather than filing separate class actions. 
Advocates of the replacement theory could answer that efficiency 
and workability are hindered by the result caused by the contingency 
theory because the class must start all over again with considerable 
repetition of time, expense, and effort.  Parties to a class action may, 
and generally do, seek some discovery prior to certification, which can 
be costly and time consuming.  In addition, the presiding judge develops 
some familiarity with the factual and legal issues, parties, and attorneys 
involved.  Under the contingency theory, discovery would have to begin 
anew, possibly before a different judge (or multiple different judges, if 
one or more of the three new actions is assigned to a different judge) 
who knows nothing about the case or the individuals involved.  Certain 
factual or legal issues resolved or argued prior to certification may have 
to be relitigated.  And, finally, because certification is often a highly 
contentious issue, the time between filing and a certification decision 
could span several years and cost enormous sums of money on both 
sides.  In such cases, some plaintiffs may have a statute of limitations 
problem, or they may no longer be willing (or able) to be class 
members.  A replacement theorist would argue that these costs to 
 
 200 See Rubenstein, supra note 44, at 434 (citing efficiency as the “primary argument for 
aggregation in mass tort cases”). 
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efficiency are unnecessary in light of the nearly equivalent end effect of 
certification of smaller but multiple classes.  Efficiency and cost-
effectiveness is, after all, what Rule 23 is all about. 
Advocates of the contingency theory could respond that the costs 
inherent in their theory will cause the plaintiff to evaluate his class more 
carefully at the outset.  If the class is sustainable only in parts, then the 
plaintiff should bring it as such.  And, when that happens, economy and 
efficiency are furthered by less contentious certification issues.  In other 
words, the market will right itself and produce the most efficient result. 
The problem with this argument is that it may not be feasible for 
the plaintiff to know, before any discovery, what the proper scope of the 
class action should be.  Indeed, class actions are designed to be flexible 
so that the proper scope can be developed during the initial stages of the 
litigation and then be decided at certification.  It is therefore doubtful 
that the market will right itself in this case.  It is more likely that, if the 
contingency theory governed, a very few class plaintiffs would 
approximate the proper scope of the class properly, many others would 
underestimate the size of the class and exclude otherwise viable claims 
out of the fear of failing certification and facing large costs, and many 
others would still overestimate the size of their class, even in a good 
faith attempt to get the scope right, because they do not possess 
sufficient facts to make an accurate determination. 
In addition, such a rigid all-or-nothing approach to certification is 
contrary to the spirit of flexibility in Rule 23.  As I explained above, the 
certification process is a give-and-take development of an 
understanding of the case and where the Rule 23 boundaries should be 
drawn.  Rule 23(c)(1) is specifically designed to address class scope 
issues after the class is defined and certified and provides for 
certification “at an early practicable time” to allow for proper factual 
development to ascertain the proper scope of the class after the 
complaint is filed.201 
A stronger argument for the contingency theory is that the 
elimination of the global class from consideration could create a 
preposterous combination of subclasses.  One can imagine, for example, 
the replacement theory extended to its logical conclusion: that any class 
could be broken down into thousands, or even millions, of individual 
subclasses—each with its own representative, common issues, and legal 
counsel—as long as each subclass independently satisfies Rule 23(a) 
and Rule 23(b).202  In another direction, one can imagine the 
 
 201 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A) (directing courts to certify “at an early practicable time”); id.  at 
R. 23(c)(1)(C) (“An order [of certification] may be altered or amended before final judgment.”). 
 202 As one commentator has suggested, issue classes allow a court to isolate the common 
issues for class certification and leave the uncommon issues for individualized litigation so that 
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replacement theory generating completely uncommon subclasses if the 
global class no longer needs to satisfy Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality 
requirement of one common issue uniting the class.  Finally, consider a 
gender discrimination action alleging that a tap-on-the-shoulder system 
permits illegal gender bias to infect a company’s promotion criteria.203  
The replacement theory would support such a claim being brought by 
both men and women in the same class—its solution would just be to 
create a subclass of men and a subclass of women. 
If the global class must still satisfy Rule 23, as the contingency 
theory dictates, then a court can easily deny certification of these odd 
developments.204  Under the replacement theory, however, one could 
argue that a court considers only the certifiability of the subclasses, and 
if each independently satisfies Rule 23, then that court should certify 
them, irrespective of the manageability problems they cause as a group. 
Although these odd situations present an intriguing thought 
experiment, I am convinced that courts have tools at their disposal to 
ensure that they do not arise in practice.  Rule 23(c)(1) allows a court 
considerable flexibility in defining and modifying the class.205  In 
addition, Rule 23(d) grants a court the power to make appropriate orders 
“determining the course of proceedings or prescribing measures to 
prevent undue repetition or complication in the presentation of evidence 
or argument”206 or “imposing conditions on the representative parties or 
on intervenors.”207  Also, nothing in Rule 23(b)(3) restricts the 
superiority inquiry to so narrow a focus as the particular class or 
subclass under scrutiny without consideration to other related cases or 
classes that may affect the maintainability or integrity of the class at 
issue.  Finally, Rule 23(c)(4)(B) itself grants courts authority to subclass 
only “when appropriate,” and even then the court “may”—but need 
 
the “issue class” will always satisfy commonality and predominance.  See Shapiro, supra note 7, 
at 958. 
 203 See, e.g., Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
 204 For example, the court could hold that too many subclasses make the global class 
unmanageable under Rule 23(b)(3).  See Cent. Wesleyan Coll. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 6 F.3d 177, 
189 (4th Cir. 1993) (reversing a certification of a class with causes of action arising under several 
different states’ laws and rejecting the district court’s attempt to create subclasses by state 
because the subclasses would “pose management difficulties and reduce the judicial efficiency 
sought to be achieved through certification”); MANUAL OF COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 7, § 
21.23, at 340-41 states: 
The creation of a number of subclasses may . . . make the case unmanageable, or, in a 
Rule 23(b)(3) suit, may defeat the superiority requirement.  Denial of class status in 
such circumstances is appropriate; if conflicts and differences among class members 
are so sharp that a number of small subclasses result, class treatment may not be 
justified in the first place. 
 205 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1). 
 206 Id. at R. 23(d)(1). 
 207 Id. at R. 23(d)(3). 
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not—subclass.208  In short, even if these horribles were ever to parade 
before a court, it would have the means to deal with them.209 
In sum, therefore, efficiency and workability supports the 
replacement theory. 
 
F.     Supreme Court 
 
As I discussed above, the Supreme Court has not resolved the 
conflict between the two theories of subclassing.  However, a close 
analysis of one of the cases I discussed above does provide some 
support for the contingency theory, and I feel obliged to address it. 
In Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,210 the Supreme Court 
reversed certification of the settlement class because it failed to meet the 
adequacy and predominance requirements of Rule 23.  In discussing the 
deficiency of representation, the Court several times alluded to the lack 
of subclasses,211 suggesting that, in the Court’s view, Rule 23(c)(4)(B) 
could have helped the class overcome its divergences to satisfy Rule 
23(a)(4).212 
In contrast to its discussion on adequacy, however, the Court did 
not opine on subclasses in the context of the predominance deficiency.  
The Court merely stated: “Given the greater number of questions 
peculiar to the several categories of class members, and to individuals 
within each category, and the significance of those uncommon 
questions, any overarching dispute about the health consequences of 
asbestos exposure cannot satisfy the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance 
standard.”213  The Court did not consider whether subclasses could have 
remedied the predominance problem by, for example, isolating 
disparate interests to permit commonality to predominate within each 
subgroup individually.  The Court’s failure to suggest subclasses in this 
instance, when considered in light of its suggestion that subclasses 
 
 208 Id. at R. 23(c)(4). 
 209 Rule 23 could benefit from clarification on this point, however. 
 210 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
 211 Id. at 626 (stating that “named parties with diverse medical conditions sought to act on 
behalf of a single giant class rather than on behalf of discrete subclasses”); id. at 627 (“Although 
the named parties alleged a range of complaints, each served generally as representative for the 
whole, not for a separate constituency.”); id. (“‘Where differences among members of a class are 
such that subclasses must be established, we know of no authority that permits a court to approve 
a settlement without creating subclasses on the basis of consents by members of a unitary class, 
some of whom happen to be members of the distinct subgroups.’”) (quoting In re Joint E. & S. 
Dist. Asbestos Litig., 982 F.2d 721, 742-43 (2d Cir. 1992)).  
 212 Id. at 626-27.  The dissent appeared to agree.  Id. at 636 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“These 
differences might warrant subclasses, though subclasses can have problems of their own.”). 
 213 Id. at 624. 
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could aid typicality, could imply that the Court did not believe that 
subclassing could remedy the predominance problems.  This part of 
Amchem could support, inferentially, the contingency theory. 
Additional support for the contingency theory comes from the 
Court’s discussion of Rule 23(e).  In rejecting the argument that Rule 
23(e) provides an independent mechanism for certifying classes for 
settlement purposes if the settlement is “fair,” the Court reasoned that 
Rule 23(e), unlike Rule 23(a) and (b), was not designed to assure class 
cohesion.214  Rule 23(e), instead, was designed as an additional 
requirement, not a superseding one.215  Although Amchem did not make 
the analogy, one could argue that Rule 23(c)(4) operates the same way: 
that Rule 23(c)(4), placed outside of the certification requirement 
sections of Rule 23(a) and (b), and placed instead among the 
housekeeping sections of Rule 23, is no substitute for Rule 23(a) and (b) 
compliance but rather is an additional requirement that can be 
implemented only when Rule 23(a) and (b) have been met. 
But the Court could have failed to mention subclasses in the 
predominance discussion for any number of reasons, and the Court did 
not itself draw any analogy between Rule 23(e) and Rule 23(c).216  
Thus, my response to these arguments is that they are interpretations of 
Supreme Court language from a case that does not primarily focus on 
Rule 23(c)(4) and that until the Court provides more than this tangential 
guidance, the text of the Rule and the other support for the replacement 




Subclassing and certification are topics whose paths are likely to 
cross more and more in the near future.  In this Article, I have attempted 
to show that the current body of law and commentary is unsettled on 
whether subclasses can completely replace consideration of the global 
class or whether subclasses can only be certified if the global class is 
also certified.  I have also attempted to demonstrate that the best 
interpretation of Rule 23(c)(4)(B)—as written, and under the current 
Supreme Court precedent and prevailing circuit sentiment—is the 
replacement theory.  I have done so while making the strongest 
 
 214 Id. at 620-21, 623. 
 215 Id. at 620-21. 
 216 Though I find them too tangential to this Article to address them in significant depth, there 
are good reasons to resist analogizing Rule 23(e) to Rule 23(c) in this instance.  For example, 
Rule 23(e)(1) restricts the power of the court to approve a class settlement, whereas Rule 23(c)(4) 
grants the court the power to subclass. 
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arguments for the contingency theory along the way.  I do not believe 
that these arguments are so easily dismissed.  Indeed, they have much to 
commend them.  They are, in my opinion, strong enough to call into 
doubt the certainty of the replacement theory as the correct 
interpretation (although I think, for all of the reasons stated above, that 
it is the best interpretation). 
In light of that, I would be remiss not to address two issues that the 
replacement theory may implicate with the new Class Action Fairness 
Act of 2005, or CAFA.217   Because CAFA is so new, its substantive 
provisions have been examined too infrequently to make this a detailed 
analysis, so I include this brief discussion only in my concluding 
thoughts and leave a deeper analysis for another day. 
First, CAFA was enacted partly in the hope that fewer class actions 
would survive in federal court.218  The replacement theory is thus in 
some tension with the spirit of CAFA because it provides federal courts 
with more tools to retain large class actions.  Second, CAFA provides 
for diversity jurisdiction if the total amount in controversy exceeds $5 
million,219 whereas prior to CAFA, some federal courts required each 
class member to satisfy the $75,000 amount-in-controversy 
jurisdictional limit.220  Under the replacement theory, in which the 
global class is disregarded and the case proceeds with just multiple 
subclasses, it is unclear whether the CAFA $5 million jurisdictional 
limit would apply to the uncertified global class or would be required of 
each subclass individually.  The replacement theory may then cause 
some confusion in the applicability of CAFA’s amount-in-controversy 
requirement. 
These tensions with CAFA may come to a head in the near future, 
and it is unclear how they will be resolved.  My hope is that this article 
will be a call for further discussion on these issues and, ultimately, 
clarification by the Rules Committee or the Supreme Court.  Until then, 
I believe that, for better or for worse, the replacement theory is the 
proper interpretation of Rule 23(c)(4)(B). 
 
 
 217 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4. 
 218 See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at (2005) (stating that state court “judges have reputations for 
readily certifying classes”). 
 219 Class Action Fairness Act § 4(d)(2). 
 220 See, e.g., Trimble v. Asarco, Inc., 232 F.3d 946 (8th Cir. 2000); Meritcare, Inc. v. St. Paul 
Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214 (3d Cir. 1999); Leonhardt v. W. Sugar Co., 160 F.3d 631 (10th 
Cir. 1998); see also Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973).  But see Rosmer v. Pfizer, Inc., 
263 F.3d 110 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that only the named plaintiff need satisfy the jurisdictional 
amount); Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 333 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2003) (same); Gibson 
v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927 (9th Cir. 2001) (same); Stromberg Metal Works Inc. v. Press 
Mech. Inc., 77 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 1996) (same); In re Abbott Labs., Inc., 51 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 
1995) (same). 
